Abstract. In this paper we s h o w some e cient and unconditionally secure oblivious transfer reductions. Our main tool is a class of functions that generalizes the Zig-zag functions, introduced by Brassard, Crep eau, and S antha in 6]. We s h o w necessary and su cient conditions for the existence of such generalized functions, and some characterizations in terms of well known combinatorial structures. Moreover, we point o u t an interesting relation between these functions and ramp secret sharing schemes where each share is a single bit.
Introduction
The oblivious transfer is a well known cryptographic primitive. Introduced by Rabin in 24] , and subsequently de ned in di erent forms in 16, 5] , it has found many applications in cryptographic studies and protocol design. One of the most common forms in which the oblivious transfer is used is the following 1 5] : Let S, the Sender, and let R, the Receiver, be two p l a yers. Assume that S holds n secrets of`bits and R is interested in one of them, say t h e i-th one. An oblivious transfer protocol enables R to receive t h e i-th secret out of the n S holds in such a w ay that -S does not know which o f t h e n secrets R has received -R does not receive a n y information on the other secrets S holds.
We will refer to such a protocol as to an ; n of the oblivious transfer many papers 6, 12, 11, 13, 14, 22, 23] , assuming that an ; n 1 -OT`is available, have been focusing on designing protocols that realize an ; N 1 -OT L , where N n and L `, using in an e cient w ay the given ; n 1 -OT`. Such kind of protocols are usually referred to as oblivious transfer reductions.
In 14], unconditionally secure oblivious transfer reductions have been studied. Lower bounds on the number of times an ; n 1 -OT`oblivious transfer protocol must be called to realize an ; N 1 -OT L one, as well as on the number of random bits needed to implement s u c h a reduction, have b e e n p r o ven. The bounds were shown to be tight when the parameter L =`. Unfortunately, w h e n L > , t h e trivial extension of the described protocol leaks some information. Actually, a cheating receiver is able to obtain pieces of di erent secrets.
In this paper we focus our attention on unconditionally secure reductions of Zig-zag functions have been deeply studied in the last years. The authors of 6] showed that linear Zig-zag functions are equivalent to a special class of codes, the self-intersecting codes 9]. Moreover, they described several e cient methods to construct these codes. On the other hand, Stinson, in 25], found bounds and combinatorial characterizations both for linear and for non-linear Zig-zag functions. Applying techniques developed in 25,26], we s h o w necessary and su cient conditions for the existence of generalized Zig-zag functions, and some characterizations in terms of orthogonal arrays and large set of orthogonal arrays as well.
Then, we show that the reduction presented in 14] can be viewed as a twostage process, and using a ramp secret sharing scheme 1] in the rst stage, we set up a reduction of ; N 1 -OT L to ; n 1 -OT`, w h i c h is optimal with respect to the numb e r o f i n vocations of the available ; n 1 -OT`, up to a factor 2. Finally, w e point out an interesting relation between generalized Zig-zags and ramp secret sharing schemes where the size of each share is exactly one bit.
Oblivious Transfer
The following de nitions were given by Brassard, Crep eau, and S antha in 6] and were used, in a slightly simpli ed form 2 in 14]. We refer the reader to 6] for more details. 2 The goal of that paper was to nd out lower bounds and the awareness condition does not in uence them in any w ay Assume that S and R hold two programs, S and R respectively, w h i c h specify the computations to be performed by the players to achieve ; N 1 -OT L . These programs encapsulate, as black b o x, ideal ; n 1 -OT`. Hence, during the execution, S and R are able to carry out many times unconditionally secure ; n 1 -OT`. I n order to model dishonest behaviours, where one of the player tries to obtain unauthorized information from the other, we assume that a cheating S (resp. R) holds a modi ed version of the program, denoted by S (resp. R).
Let P 0 P 1 ](a)(b) be the random variable representing the output obtained by S and R when they execute together their own programs, P 0 held by S and P 1 held by R, with private inputs a and b, respectively. Moreover, let P 0 P 1 ] (a)(b) be the random variable that describes the total information acquired during the execution of the protocol on input a and b, a n d l e t P 0 P 1 ] S (a)(b) (resp. P 0 P 1 ] R (a)(b)) be the random variable obtained by restricting P 0 P 1 ] (a)(b) to S (resp. to R). These restrictions are the view each p l a yer has while running the protocol. 
Notice that condition (1) means that two honest players always complete successfully the execution of the protocol. More precisely, R receives w T , t h e secret in which h e i s i n terested, while S receives nothing. The output pair ( w i ),
where denotes the empty string, describes this situation. On the other hand, condition (2), referred to as the awareness condition, means that, when R does not abort, a dishonest S cannot induce on R's output a distribution that he could not induce by c hanging the input (Sim(w)) and being honest. As explained in 6], this condition is necessary for future uses of the output of the protocol.
Assuming that both S and R are aware of the joint probability distribution P W T on W and T, the probability with which S chooses the secrets in W and R chooses an index i 2 T, and using the mutual information 3 between two random variables, the privacy property o f ; N 1 -OT L can be de ned as follows: 3 The reader is referred to Appendix A for the de nition and some basic properties of the concept of mutual information.
De nition 2. 
These two conditions ensure that a dishonest S does not gain information about R's index and a dishonest R infers at most one secret among the ones held by S.
Unconditionally Secure Reductions
In the literature can be found many unconditionally secure reductions of more \complex" OT to \simpler" ones 11, 12, 4, 14] . The e ciency of such reductions has been careful analyzed in 14]. Therein, the authors considered two t ypes of reductions: reductions for strong An honest R always obtains the secret in which h e i s i n terested in, recovering the \right" pieces at each execution. On the other hand, a cheating R is able to recover L pieces of possibly di erent secrets among w = w 1 : : : w N . W e w ould like to modify this basic construction in order to achieve condition (4) without losing too much in e ciency.
Brassard, Crep eau, and S antha solved a similar problem in 6]. They studied how to reduce ; 2 1 -OT`to ; 2 1 -OT 1 in an information theoretic secure way. Starting from the observation that trivial serial executions of`; 2 1 -OT 1 oblivious transfer, one for each bit of the two secret strings w 0 and w 1 , didn't work, they pursued the idea of nding a function f where, given x 0 and x 1 such that f(x 0 ) = w 0 and f(x 1 ) = w 1 , f r o m t wo disjoint subsets of bits of x 0 and x 1 it is possible to gain information on at most one of w 0 and w 1 . Using such a (public) function, the reduction would have been simple to implement ( s e e T able 2).
The property o f f ensures that an honest receiver is always able to recover one of the secrets, while a dishonest receiver can obtain information on at most one of the secrets. They called such functions Zig-zag functions.
Notice that we h a ve t o s o l v e a v ery close problem: in our scenario, a cheating receiver is able to obtain partial information about many secrets. Our aim is to nd out a class of functions where disjoint subsets of strings x 1 x 2 ::: give information about at most one of the secrets w 1 w 2 : : :
Protocol strongly reducing Table 2 . Protocol for two secrets of`bits 4 Generalized Zig-zag Functions Let X = GF (q), and let X n = f(x 1 : : : x n ) : x i 2 X for 1 i ng. Moreover, for each I = fi 1 : : : i jIj g f 1 : : : n g, denote by x I = ( x i1 : : : x i jI j ) t h e subsequence of x 2 X n indexed by I. Finally, l e t X I be the set of all possible subsequences x I for a given I.
A function is unbiased with respect to a subset I if the knowledge of the value of x I does not give any information about f(x). More formally, w e h a ve the following de nition De nition 3. Suppose that f : X n ! X m , w h e r e n m. L et I f 1 : : : n g. We say that f is unbiased with respect to I if, for all possible choices of x I 2 X I , and for every (y 1 : : : y m ) 2 X m , there a r e exactly q n;m;jIj choices for x f1 ::: ngnI such that f(x 1 : : : x n ) = ( y 1 : : : y m ):
This concept has been introduced in 6]. Actually, the form in which i t i s stated here is the same as 25]. Since we are going to follow the same approach applied in 25] to study the properties of linear and nonlinear Zig-zag functions, we prefer this de nition. The de nition of Zig-zag functions relies on the unbiased property.
De nition 4. A function f : X n ! X m is said to be a Zig-zag function if, for every I f 1 : : : n g f is unbiased w i t h r espect to at least one of I and f1 : : : n g n I.
We w ould like some \generalized" Zig-zag property, holding for di erent disjoint subsets of indices. Roughly speaking, a generalized Zig-zag function should be unbiased with respect to at least s ; 1 of the subsets I 1 : : : I s into which f1 : : : n g is partitioned (for all possible partitions). More formally, w e can state the following De nition 5. Let s be a n i n t e ger such that 2 s n. A f u n c t i o n f : X n ! X m is said to be a n s-Zig-zag function if, for every set of s subsets I 1 : : : I s f1 : : : n g such that i I i = f1 : : : n g, and I j \ I j = if i 6 = j, f is unbiased with respect to at least s ; 1 of I 1 : : : I s .
In
then he can get information on at most one w i . I f t h e a b o ve property i s s a t i s e d for every 2 s n, t h e n w e s a y t h a t f is fully Zig-zag (see Appendix B for an example of such a function). Fully Zig-zag functions enable us to apply the same approach d e v eloped in 6] in order to substitute the real secrets w i with some pre-images x i of w i . The generalized property of the function ensures the privacy of the transfer.
Note: The functions f : X n ! X m we are looking for must be e cient to compute. Moreover, there must exist an e cient procedure to compute a random pre-image x 2 f ;1 (y), for each y 2 X m .
Zig-zag and Fully Zig-zag Functions.
We brie y review some de nitions and known results about Zig-zag. A Zig-zag (resp. s-Zig-zag, fully Zig-zag) function is said to be linear if there exists an m n matrix M with entries from GF (q) s u c h t h a t f(x) = xM T for all x 2 GF (q) n .
The following results have been shown in 25] and are recalled here since they will be used in the following subsection. The next lemma shows an upper bound on the size of the set of index I with respect to a function can be unbiased. Proof. We g i v e t h e p r o o f f o r n = 2 m ; 1. The if part is straightforward. Indeed, if f is fully Zig-zag, then for each partition I 1 : : : I s of f1 : : : n g f i s u n biased with respect to at least s ; 1 subsets out of the s in the partition. Hence, it is unbiased with respect to at least 1 subset out of the 2 for any possible bipartition of f1 : : : n g. Therefore, f is Zig-zag.
Assume now that f is Zig-zag. Hence, by de nition, for each I f 1 : : : n g, f is unbiased with respect to at least one of I and f1 : : : n g n I.
Let I 1 : : : I s be a partition of f1 : : : n g. W e can consider two cases.
a) There exists a subset I i of the partition such that jI i j > n ; m: Consider this subset. Since f is Zig-zag, by L e m m a 1 , f is unbiased with respect to f1 : : : n g n I i . B u t f1 : : : n g n I i = j6 =i I j : Hence, applying Lemma 3, we can conclude that f is unbiased with respect to all I j , for j 6 = i: b) For each i = 1 : : : s , jI i j n ; m: Notice that, since n = 2 m ; 1, jI i j n ; m , j I i j 2m ; 1 ; m , j I i j m ; 1: Since f is a Zig-zag function, applying Theorem 3, we can say t h a t f is unbiased with respect to all I i : jI i j = m ; 1. Therefore, by Lemma 3, we can conclude that f is unbiased with respect to all of I 1 : : : I s : Therefore, f is fully Zig-zag. u t
The proof for n > 2m ; 1 is similar. Therefore, we can conclude saying that Zig-zag and fully Zig-zag de nitions de ne the same class of functions. Therefore, the known constructions for Zig-zag functions enable us to improve the protocol described in Table 1 by substituting the secrets with the pre-images of a Zigzag functions, as done in the protocol described in Table 2 for two secrets. A complete description of our protocol can be found in Table 3 -S picks random x0 x 1 : : : x N ;1 2 f 0 1g P such that, for i = 0 : : : N ;1, f(xi) = wi: -S performs the protocol described in Table 1 , using x0 x 1 : : : x N ;1 instead of the real secrets w0 : : : w N ;1. -R recovers xi, and computes wi = f(xi). Table 3 . General protocol, depending on f. 4 After the submission of this extended abstract to the conference, we found out that Dodis and Micali, working on the journal version of the paper presented at Eurocrypt '99, have independently obtained the same reduction, which will appear in the full version of their paper.
On the Existence of s-Zig-zags.
A question coming up to mind now is the following: Zig-zag functions are equivalent to fully Zig-zag functions. But these functions, according to Lemma Proof. Notice that, by de nition, f must be unbiased with respect to at least s ; 1 subsets of each possible s-partition. It is not di cult to check that the worst case we h a ve to consider is when a partition has s ; 2 s u b s e t s o f s i z e 1 and two subsets of essentially the same size. Therefore, f must be unbiased with respect to at least one of the two \big" subsets. Hence, applying Lemma 1, it follows that b n ; (s ; 2) 2 c n ; m: (6) The result follows by simple algebra. u t An interesting relation between s-Zig-zag and t-Zig-zag, where t s, is stated by the following lemma, whose proof can be obtained essentially noticing that a t-partition is a re nement o f a n s-partition.
Lemma 5. If f : X n ! X m is s-Zig-zag, then f is t-Zig-zag for every s < t n.
A C o m binatorial Characterization.
Let t be an integer such t h a t 1 t k and v 2. An orthogonal array OA (t k v) i s a v t k array A of v symbols, such that within any t columns of A, e v ery possible t-tuple of symbols occurs in exactly rows of A. An orthogonal array i s simple if it does not contain two i d e n tical rows. A large set of orthogonal arrays OA (t k v), denoted LOA (t k v), is a set of v k;t = simple OA (t k v), such t h a t e v ery possible k-tuple occurs as a row in exactly one of the orthogonal arrays in the set (see 20] for the theory and applications of these structures). 
Towards a General Reduction
The protocol described before can be conceptually divided in two phases: a rst phase in which x i is split into several pieces and R needs all the pieces to retrieve x i and a second phase where, once having obtained x i , R recovers the secret by computing y i = f(x i ) for some function f. Since each piece gives partial knowledge of x i , f needs to hide the value of y i according to the de nition of a correct and private reduction (i.e., the Zig-zag property). In this section, we show that using in the rst phase an appropriate ramp secret sharing scheme 1] (see Appendix D for a brief review of the de nition and some basic properties) to share x i then, in the second phase the function f needs weaker requirements than the Zig-zag property. In this case, the pieces that R recovers from each transfer are not substrings of the value x i he needs to compute the real secret y i = f(x i ), but shares that he has to combine according to the given ramp scheme in order to recover x i .
Actually, notice that the splitting of the strings can be seen as a sharing according to a (0 p p )-RS, where p is jx i j and`is the size of each share/piece.
The questions therefore are: is it possible to design an overall better protocol, using in the rst phase some non trivial ramp scheme to share x i . The de nition means that at most one subset of shares can give information about f(x).
It is easy to see that, when the ramp secret sharing scheme used in the rst phase of the protocol is the trivial (0 p p )-RS (shares/pieces of one bit), De nition 6 is equivalent to fully Zig-zag functions.
An A lmost Optimal Reduction. Using a ( n 2 n n )-RS it is immediate to see that, to acquire information on x i , the adversary needs at least n 2 + 1 shares. Hence, recovering partial information on one secret rules out the possibility o f r e c o vering partial information on another secret. Notice that with such a s c heme, if each secret has size p and`divides p, the bound on the size of the shares (see Appendix D) implies n 2p (numb e r o f i n vocations of the given ; N 1 -OT`). An implementation meeting the bound for several values of p and`can be set up using, for example, the protocol described in 17]. In this case the function f used in the second phase can be simply the identity function! 6 Ramp Secret Sharing Schemes with Shares of One Bit Fully Zig-zag, s-Zig-zag and Zig-zag functions give rise to ramp secret sharing schemes with shares of one bit. The idea is the following: the dealer, given one of these functions, say f : X n ! X m , c hooses a secret y 2 X m and computes a random pre-image x 2 f ;1 (y). Then, he distributes the secret among the set of n participants giving, as a share, a single bit of the pre-image x to each o f t h e m . It is immediate to see that -some subsets of participants do not gain any information about the secret, even if they pool together their shares. These subsets are the subsets of f1 : : : n g with respect to the function f is unbiased.
-some subsets of participants are able to recover partial information about the secret. These are the subsets of f1 : : : n g with respect to f is biased -all the participants are able to recover the whole secret.
The idea of such constructions was recently described in 8] (see Remark 9) as an application of`-AONT transforms. In that construction, however, the dealer distributes among the participants the bits of the image of the secret while we distribute the bits of a pre-image of the secret.
Conclusions
In this paper we h a ve s h o wn how t o a c hieve e cient unconditionally secure re- { Linear Zig-zag are equivalent t o self-intersecting codes. I s t h e r e a n y c haracterization in terms of codes for s-Zig-zag functions? And what about some e cient constructions? Is it possible, along the same line of 6], to set up any deterministic or probabilistic method?
